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[A] principle, to be vital, must be capable of wider application than the
mischief which gave it birth. This is peculiarly true of constitutions.
—Weems v. United States1
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INTRODUCTION
Every day in 2018, enough bytes cross the internet to encode 200,000 years of
DVD-quality video.2 By 2021, data volume is expected to roughly double.3 Not only
are data moving in supermassive quantities, servers are quietly sweeping a wider
variety of data from a startling range of interconnected devices and apps.4 Web-
connected products from televisions to fitness bracelets to thermostats leave an online
data trail,5 potentially vulnerable to inspection, misuse, and theft.6
Federal and state governments have a range of tools to protect Americans’ per-
sonal data from such intrusions. Various hacking activities, wiretapping, “spoofing,”
identity theft, and certain misrepresentations are already illegal.7 But one scenario is
relatively shielded from sanction: if a hacker launders stolen data to a third party,
the third party often has the blessing of the First Amendment to publish it.
To understand this story, I begin with Title III of the Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968, also called the Wiretap Act. The Wiretap Act, as currently amended,
prohibits various invasions and disclosures of wire, oral, and electronic communications.8
Among other things, the Act authorizes both criminal and civil causes of action for
private hacking and wiretapping activities,9 prohibits unauthorized sharing of an
authorized law enforcement wiretap,10 and prohibits the use of stolen information,
such as for commercial purposes.11 Section 2511(1)(c), however, deals not with the
commission of a wiretapping offense, but with disclosure: it prohibits disclosure of
information when the disclosing party knew or should have known the communica-
tions were obtained by unlawful interception.12 In § 2511(1)(c), Congress deemed
2 See The Zettabyte Era: Trends and Analysis, CISCO (June 7, 2017), https://www
.cisco.com/c/en/us/solutions/collateral/service-provider/visual-networking-index-vni/vni
-hyperconnectivity-wp.html [https://perma.cc/HZ5E-GZC9] (giving overview of trends in
communications and network technology); 2 TONY PEARSON, INSIDE SYSTEM STORAGE 95
(2010).
3 See CISCO, supra note 2.
4 See PEARSON, supra note 2.
5 See CISCO, supra note 2.
6 See id.
7 See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a)–(b) (2012).
8 See Pub. L. No. 90-351, §§ 2511–2520, 82 Stat. 197, 213–25 (1968) (codified as
currently amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–20 (2012)).
9 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(d); § 2520(a).
10 § 2511(1)(e). The elements of § 2511(1)(e) essentially require a knowing obstruction
of a law enforcement investigation. See id.
11 See § 2511(1)(d).
12 The Wiretap Act of 1968 was amended in 1986 to include electronic data interceptions
and thefts, in addition to wiretapping. See Elec. Comms. Privacy Act, Pub. L. No. 99-508,
100 Stat. 1848 (1986); see also the statutory text, infra note 26. Accordingly, in this Note,
the terms “wiretap” or “wiretapping” should be generally understood, unless otherwise im-
plied, to include interception of any wire, oral, or electronic communication.
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the publication of one’s stolen private communications sufficiently subversive of “the
comforts of society” as to merit the recourse of the law.13 Lawmakers sought to protect
private speech and to deter the amplification of stolen conversations.14 Most states
adopted similar statutes.15
Under the federal statute, the disclosing party may be the wiretapper herself or
another.16 The disclosing party might be innocent in the initial theft, but liable for
spreading the fruits of such theft.17 The third-party publisher in the three-party scenario
has herself invaded no private communications; she is (in theory) merely sharing what
she has found. What are the legitimate Free Speech interests of the publisher?
In 2001, the First Amendment met such an application of § 2511(1)(c) of the
Wiretap Act head-on in Bartnicki v. Vopper.18 In Bartnicki, the Supreme Court addressed
13 Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell’s St. Trials 1029, 1066 (C.P. 1765).
14 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511–2020.
15 See ALA. CODE § 13A-11-35 (2018); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 42.20.300(d) (West 2017);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-60-120(c)(3) (West 2017); CAL. PENAL CODE § 631(a) (West 2018);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-303(c) (2018); DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 11, § 1335(a)(5) (2018); D.C.
CODE § 23-542(a)(2) (2018); FLA. STAT. §§ 934.03(1)(c)–(e) (2017); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11
-62(5) (2017); HAW. REV. STAT. § 803-42(a)(3) (2017); IDAHO CODE § 18-6702(1)(c) (2017);
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-2(a)(5) (2018) (invalidated as overbroad in People v. Clark, 6
N.E.3d 154 (Ill. 2014); People v. Melongo, 6 N.E.3d 120 (Ill. 2014)); IOWA CODE
§ 808B.2(1)(c) (2017); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6101(a)(2) (2017); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 526.060 (West 2018); LA. STAT. ANN. § 15:1303 (2017); ME. STAT. tit. 15, § 710(3) (2017);
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-402(a)(2) (West 2018); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272,
§ 99(C)(3) (2017); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 750.539d & 750.539e (2018); MINN. STAT.
§ 626A.02(1)(3) (2017); MO. REV. STAT. § 542.402(1)(3) (2017); NEB. REV. STAT. § 86
-290(1)(c) (2017); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.630 (2017); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 570-A:2(I)(c)
(2018); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:156A-3(b) (2017); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-12-1 (2018); N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 250.25(4) (McKinney 2018); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-287(a)(3) (2017); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 12.1-15-02(1)(b) (2017); OKLA. STAT., tit. 13, § 176.3(3) (2018); ORE. REV.
STAT. § 165.540(1)(e) (2018); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5703(2) (2018); 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-35
-21(a)(2) (2017); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-30-20(3) (2017); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-601(a)
(1)(C) (2017); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 16.02(b)(2) (2017); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-23a
-4(1)(b)(iii) (2017); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-62(A)(3) (2018); W. VA. CODE § 62-1D-3(a)(2)
(2017); WIS. STAT. § 968.31(1)(c) (2018); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-3-702(a)(iii) (2017); see also
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-41p (2017); IND. CODE § 35-33.5-5-4(a) (2017); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 21-5923 (2017); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-29-511 (2017); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-213
(2017); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2933.52(A) (2017); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-35A-18
(2018); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 8108 (2017); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.73.030 (2018); P.R.
LAWS ANN. tit. 25, § 285q (2017).
16 See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(c).
17 See id.
18 532 U.S. 514 (2001). For those interested, the petitioner’s name is apparently pronounced
as the Americanized “Bartnicky,” and not the Polish “Bartnitzky.” See Oral Argument at 0:07,
2:49, Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) (No. 99-1687), https://apps.oyez.org/player
/#/rehnquist10/oral_argument_audio/22162 [https://perma.cc/KJD9-8UX4].
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whether it is constitutional to punish the publication “[w]here the punished publisher
of information has obtained the information in question in a manner lawful in itself
but from a source who has obtained it unlawfully. . . .”19 A fractured Court held that
such communications—when truthful and regarding matters of “public concern”—are
protected under the First Amendment.20
But “time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes.”21
In the years since Bartnicki, the facts of which occurred in 1993,22 communications
technology has transformed. Petabytes of emails, photographs, texts, voicemails, and
other documents now transmit through the web and are stored and maintained on the
“cloud”—often without the understanding of the communicant.23 High-profile
incidents of hacking of private communications, including intimate personal informa-
tion and photographs, have raised the issues of illegally sourced information and
“public concern” to the fore.24
In this Note, I argue that vast technosocial changes arising since Bartnicki shift
the constitutional balance of interests sufficiently such that Bartnicki should be abro-
gated. While the Free Speech interests at the heart of Bartnicki are no less important
today than in 2001, the risks to private communicants are dramatically higher such
that the Free Speech Clause must yield way. I propose that the Bartnicki doctrine should
be tailored to allow legislators a wider range of lawful controls on the publication
of stolen information.
In Part I of this Note, I discuss the contours of the holding, concurrence, and dis-
sent in Bartnicki, the holding’s implications, and how it has applied since 2001. In
Part II, I discuss the expansion of information technology, information collection,
and hacking and eavesdropping risks. These technosocial changes are so substantial
that even reasonable communicants cannot protect all their private communications.
I argue, therefore, that these overwhelming technosocial changes justify revisiting
Bartnicki. In Part III, I argue that the Supreme Court often evaluates and reevaluates
doctrine in response to technosocial changes, and that it is uncontroversial to suggest
the Court should revisit a holding for this reason. Finally, in Part IV, I discuss the
19 Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 528 (quoting Boehner v. McDermott, 191 F.3d 463, 484–85
(D.C. Cir. 1999) (Sentelle, J., dissenting)).
20 Id.
21 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 473 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (quoting
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910)).
22 See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 518.
23 See, e.g., Tim Fisher, Terabytes, Gigabytes, and Petabytes: How Big Are They?, LIFE-
WIRE (May 10, 2018), https://www.lifewire.com/terabytes-gigabytes-amp-petabytes-how-big
-are-they-4125169 [https://perma.cc/US46-LCR8]; Bureau International Des Poids et
Mesures, Resolution 10 of the 15th CGPM (1975), https://www.bipm.org/en/CGPM/db/15
/10/ [https://perma.cc/N364-GHWR] (adopting “peta” as the Système International prefix for
the multiplying factor of 10^15).
24 See infra Section II.B; see also infra notes 230–34 and accompanying text.
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difficult balance of privacy, free speech, and free press interests, and propose ways
the Court should loosen the doctrine to allow legislatures to deter publication of the
fruits of illegal snooping activity. I argue that in the Bartnicki context, Fourth
Amendment principles converge with the First Amendment, and the Court should
borrow certain concepts of reasonable expectation of privacy and control.
I. THE PRINCIPAL CASE: BARTNICKI V. VOPPER
The Wiretap Act established new laws regarding the interception and dissemina-
tion of private oral and wire communications.25 Among other things, the Wiretap Act
prohibited disclosure of information when the disclosing party knew or should have
known that the communications were obtained unlawfully.26 The purpose of the law,
set forth in the committee report, was to “protec[t] the privacy of wire [including
electronic] and oral communications.”27
In 2001, the Supreme Court directly addressed the application of § 2511(1)(c)
where the eavesdropper and discloser are different parties.28 In Bartnicki, a divided
Court held that truthful information of “public concern” that is originally obtained
25 Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (1968). The wiretapping provisions of the Act are
codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–22 (2012).
26 See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(c) (2012). The original 1968 text covered only “wire or oral
communication[s].” The 1968 version of the subsection read:
[A]ny person who . . . willfully discloses, or endeavors to disclose, to
any other person the contents of any wire or oral communication,
knowing or having reason to know that the information was obtained
through the interception of a wire or oral communication in violation
of this subsection . . . shall be fined not more than $10,000 or
imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act (Wiretap Act), Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197
(1968). As technology evolved, Congress extended the protections to electronic and
computer communications. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-508, 100 Stat. 1848. The most current version of § 2511(1)(c) reads:
[A]ny person who . . . intentionally discloses, or endeavors to disclose,
to any other person the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic com-
munication, knowing or having reason to know that the information
was obtained through the interception of a wire, oral, or electronic
communication in violation of this subsection . . . shall be punished as
provided in subsection (4) or shall be subject to suit as provided in
subsection (5) (emphasis added).
Finally, § 2120 authorizes a private cause of action for suit under § 2511, authorizes equita-
ble relief where necessary, and sets forth a statutory scheme for calculating damages. See
§ 2520(a)–(c).
27 S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 37 (1968).
28 See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
254 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 27:249
illegally, and then published by a third party unrelated to the initial theft, is First
Amendment protected.29
Fig. 130
It is helpful to understand the background of the case. The dispute leading to
Bartnicki involved an intercepted cell phone conversation.31 Between 1992 and 1994,
the Wyoming Valley West School District, just outside Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania,
was engaged in a contentious contract negotiation with the district’s Teachers’
Union.32 In a May 1993 cell phone call, plaintiff-petitioners Gloria Bartnicki, Chief
Union Negotiator, and Anthony Kane, Jr., Union President, were discussing the
ongoing contract negotiations.33 During their private phone conversation, Kane said,
“we’re gonna have to go to . . . their homes . . . to blow off their front porches, we’ll
have to do some work on . . . those guys . . . .”34 Kane then compared union and
district negotiating positions, complained of press leaks, and added, “don’t discuss
the items in public.”35
It was later discovered that an unknown party had secretly intercepted and tape-
recorded the cell phone conversation between Bartnicki and Kane.36 The anonymous
29 Id. at 515.
30 See id.
31 See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 200 F.3d 109, 112–13 (3d Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 530 U.S.
1260 (2000).
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 113.
35 Id.
36 Id.
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eavesdropper then delivered a cassette tape of the conversation to the mailbox of a
local anti-teachers’ union activist Jack Yocum.37 Yocum then delivered copies of the
tape to two radio stations, WILK and WGBI.38 The intercepted conversation broadcast
repeatedly on local radio stations, aired on local television, and transcripts were
published in various local newspapers.39
Bartnicki and Kane sued Yocum, WILK, WGBI, and radio D.J. Frederick Vopper
under § 2511(1)(c) and the Pennsylvania statutory equivalent.40 On cross-motions
for summary judgment, the District Court granted judgment to Bartnicki and Kane.41
On interlocutory appeal, the Third Circuit applied an intermediate scrutiny stan-
dard, concluding that § 2511(1)(c) was unconstitutional under the First Amendment
because the law was not narrowly tailored to “eliminat[e] . . . demand” for stolen
information, and because “the provisions . . . deter significantly more speech than
is necessary to serve the government’s asserted interest.”42
At the Supreme Court, however, the majority, led by Justice Stevens, did not
explicitly apply intermediate scrutiny. Instead, the Court approached the question
as a balancing of constitutional interests. Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Kennedy,
Souter, and Ginsburg, with Justices Breyer and O’Connor concurring, recognized
a “conflict between interests of the highest order”—namely, privacy and free speech.43
The majority resolved the conflict in favor of Free Speech interests,44 invalidating
§ 2511(1)(c) as applied, along with similar statutes in almost all the states.45
Stevens’s preferred conception of the flow of information was as a chain of
custody46: the publisher of information who is itself free from wrongdoing, Stevens
concluded, is not to be punished for a prior defect in the chain of custody.47
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 See id.; 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5703(2) (2018).
41 Bartnicki, 200 F.3d at 113–14. The Defendants did not dispute the facts, and summary
judgment turned entirely on the District Court finding that imposing civil liability on the
Defendants would not violate the First Amendment. See id.
42 Id. at 125–26.
43 Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 517–18.
44 As discussed infra, however, the Bartnicki Court lacked anything nearing a consensus.
Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment, joined by Justice O’Connor, arguing that legisla-
tures should have leeway to balance speech and privacy interests. Id. at 535, 541 (Breyer, J.,
concurring in the judgment). Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented, joined by Justice Scalia and
Justice Thomas. Id. at 541 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
45 See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(c); supra note 15.
46 Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 528 (“Where the punished publisher of information has obtained
the information in question in a manner lawful in itself but from a source who has obtained
it unlawfully, may the government punish the ensuing publication of that information based
on the defect in a chain?” (quoting Boehner v. McDermott, 191 F.3d 463, 484–85 (D.C. Cir.
1999) (Sentelle, J., dissenting))).
47 Id. at 528–29.
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Concurring in the judgment, Justice Breyer advocated application of a balancing
test (as he is often wont).48 The law tolerates restrictions on free speech, Breyer said,
where the speaker holds a legitimate interest in maintaining privacy, such as opening
mail or trade secret misappropriation.49 Breyer concurred, however, because the
petitioners in this case lacked a “legitimate interest” in concealing their damning
conversation from the public.50 However, Breyer suggested a more tailored statute
would pass constitutional muster.51
Finally, Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, authored
a dissent.52 Rehnquist argued that, because the statute was content-neutral, intermediate
scrutiny applied.53 In Rehnquist’s judgment, the prohibition on third-party publication
was narrowly tailored to advance the government’s legitimate interest in protecting
private speech.54 Rehnquist’s dissent presaged the thesis of this Note, arguing that
advances in technology place private conversations at exceptional risk of interception
and publication.55
Since 2001, lower courts have continued to apply § 2511(1)(c) in cases where
the disclosure originated from the same party as the wiretap,56 or where the disclosure
originated from a party who conspired with or encouraged the wiretapper.57 It is, of
course, impossible to say how many complaints have not been filed since 2001
because of Bartnicki.
This Note expresses no opinion on the Court’s original 2001 result. Rather, this
Note argues that technosocial changes since 2001 affect the continuing validity of
the earlier holding. Considering the evolution of technology since 2001, more weight
must now be placed on privacy interests and more flexibility afforded legislatures
to protect such interests. In light of the technosocial change emergent since Bartnicki,
Justice Stevens’s holding should be relaxed.
48 Id. at 536 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[T]he key question becomes one
of proper fit.” (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 520 U.S. 180, 227 (1997) (Breyer,
J., concurring in part))).
49 Id. at 539–40.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 541.
52 Id. at 541–56 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
53 Id. at 545.
54 Id. at 544.
55 Id. at 542. See also Part II infra.
56 See, e.g., Lombardo v. Lombardo, 192 F. Supp. 2d 885 (N.D. Ind. 2002) (applying
§ 2511(1)(c) in a case where a husband had secretly recorded his wife’s phone calls, and later
disclosed the recordings in divorce proceedings). After a bench trial, however, the defendant
was found liable for the wiretapping but not for the disclosure. See Lombardo v. Lombardo,
No. 1:99-CV-95, 2005 WL 1459445, at *1 (N.D. Ind. June 20, 2005).
57 See Boehner v. McDermott, 484 F.3d 573 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
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II. THE AVAILABILITY, UBIQUITY, AND VARIETY OF TECHNOLOGY HAS
CHANGED DRAMATICALLY SINCE BARTNICKI, LEAVING PRIVATE
INFORMATION FAR MORE VULNERABLE
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s prescient dissenting opinion articulates the problem58:
Technology now permits millions of important and confidential
conversations to occur through a vast system of electronic net-
works. These advances, however, raise significant privacy concerns.
We are placed in the uncomfortable position of not knowing who
might have access to our personal and business e-mails, our
medical and financial records, or our cordless and cellular tele-
phone conversations.59
This argument has grown far stronger since Bartnicki was decided.
A. Today There Are Far More Means and Opportunities to Capture Private
Communications and Information than Existed in 2001
If true in 2001, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s fears about technology have borne
further since then: about four billion gigabytes of data crisscross the internet per day,60
much without the knowledge or consent of the communicant.61 Today’s technosocial
environment presents communicants with a thicket of often subversive data collection,
storage, and machine learning.62
The facts giving rise to Bartnicki occurred in May 1993.63 In 1994 (the earliest
year for which I could find available data), there were an estimated 4.7 million
internet subscriptions worldwide.64 In 1993, there were an estimated 34 million cell
58 Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 541 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). See also Yath v. Fairview
Clinics, N.P., 767 N.W.2d 34, 44 (Ct. App. Minn. 2009) (“A town crier could reach dozens,
a handbill hundreds, a newspaper or radio station tens of thousands, a television station
millions, and now a publicly accessible webpage can present the story of someone’s private
life . . . to more than one billion Internet surfers worldwide.”).
59 Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 541 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
60 See CISCO, supra note 2. As explained in the Introduction of this Note, four billion
gigabytes of data is equivalent to about 200,000 years of DVD-quality video. See PEARSON,
supra note 2.
61 See, e.g., Nick Douglas, How Apps Use Your Photos to Track Your Location, LIFE-
HACKER (Oct. 24, 2017), https://lifehacker.com/how-apps-use-your-photos-to-track-your-lo
cation-1819802266 [https://perma.cc/BW3V-XVBE].
62 See, e.g., Sarah Perez, Facebook Is Pushing its Data-Tracking Onavo VPN Within its
Main Mobile App, TECH CRUNCH (Feb. 12, 2018), https://techcrunch.com/2018/02/12/face
book-starts-pushing-its-data-tracking-onavo-vpn-within-its-main-mobile-app/ [https://perma
.cc/BAC8-VNFS] (describing how Facebook’s “Onavo Protect” VPN software—customarily
a platform used for information privacy—is in fact collecting data on its users).
63 532 U.S. at 512–18.
64 See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE UNPREDICTABLE CERTAINTY: INFORMATION
INFRASTRUCTURE THROUGH 2000 187 (1996).
258 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 27:249
phone subscribers worldwide.65 Today, there are an estimated 920 million broadband
internet subscriptions,66 representing 3.55 billion people.67 As early as 2009, the
number of individual devices connected to the internet surpassed the number of
people on Earth.68 As of 2020, there will be about 50 billion connected devices—
about six for every woman, man, and child on Earth.69 In 2015, an estimated 206
billion emails changed hands each day worldwide70—enough for every person alive
to send about 27 emails daily.71 These connections and exchanges of information
contain, hold, and may reveal, “the privacies of life.”72
Fig. 273
65 See Mobile Cellular Subscriptions, WORLD BANK DATA (2016), https://data.worldbank
.org/indicator/IT.CEL.SETS?end=2016&start=1993 [https://perma.cc/V3GA-XGP3].
66 See Fixed Broadband Subscriptions, WORLD BANK DATA (2016), https://data.world
bank.org/indicator/IT.NET.BBND [https://perma.cc/BQX3-Y8C7].
67 See Global and Regional ICT Data, ITU (2017), https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Statis
tics/Pages/stat/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/DVG3-UMJP]. For another estimate see Inter-
net Usage Statistics: The Internet Big Picture, INTERNET WORLD STATISTICS (2018), http://
www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm [https://perma.cc/Z8ZH-ARUJ] (estimating 4.2 billion
global internet users, representing 54.4 percent of the world population).
68 See FTC, Internet of Things: Privacy & Security in a Connected World I (2015),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-staff-report
-November-2013-workshop-entitled-internet-things-privacy/150127iotrpt.pdf [https://perma
.cc/RVM9-YNPT].
69 Id.
70 Radicati Group, Email Statistics Report 2015–2019 (Mar. 2015), http://www.radicati
.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Email-Statistics-Report-2015-2019-Executive-Summary
.pdf [https://perma.cc/2YSD-XYT3].
71 See U.S. and World Population Clock, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov
/popclock/ [https://perma.cc/C6GB-QZ3J] (last visited Oct. 15, 2018) (offering an up-to-the-
second global human population estimate).
72 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) (holding that compulsory production
of private papers amounts to a search or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment).
73 For source of graph data, see Mobile Cellular Subscriptions, supra note 65.
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Not only is the volume of electronic information far greater than ever before, the
scope is greater too:
• Information changes hands via phone call, text message, voicemail,
email, Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, Snapchat, online dating apps, in-
game chat, and more.
• With the onset of the so-called “internet of things,” servers now have
access to web-connected PCs, cell phones, tablet computers, televisions,
cars,74 videogame consoles, ovens, thermostats, clocks, cameras, wrist-
watches, speakers, light bulbs, nightlights, light switches, air filters, air
vents, garage door openers, herb gardens, exercise bracelets, bathroom
scales, smoke detectors, doorbells, door locks, baby monitors, beds, lawn
sprinklers, refrigerators, blenders, coffee makers, blood pressure monitors,
and even fish finders, breathalyzers, propane tanks, and 9-volt batteries.75
• One car industry organization estimates that by 2020, 90 percent of
consumer vehicles will be web-connected.76
• As of 2018, 33 million American homes are equipped with a “smart
speaker”—an always-on artificially intelligent web-connected listening
device77—a number forecast to more than double by the end of 2018.78
The ubiquity of available data exceeds the reasonable expectations of the public
regarding the privacy and security of information—data are vulnerable that many
74 Following a story about hackers assuming remote control of a web-connected vehicle,
the Senate introduced a bill seeking to protect drivers. See Tom Risen, Would Your Smart
Car Brake for Hackers?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD RPT. (July 23, 2015, 2:31 PM), https://www
.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/07/23/can-hackers-really-target-your-smart-car [https://
perma.cc/MUM2-772R]; Security and Privacy in Your Car Act of 2015, S. 1806, 114th Cong.
(2015). This bill died in the committee. It required vehicles to adopt “isolation measures”
between “critical” and “noncritical” software, based on rules set forth by the Federal Trade
Commission. Id. See also SPY Car Study Act of 2017, H.R.701, 115th Cong. (2017) (direct-
ing the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration to conduct a study to determine
appropriate cybersecurity standards for motor vehicles).
75 For a list including the above products, see Postscapes, https://www.postscapes.com
/categories/#consumer [https://perma.cc/HYQ5-FUYR] (last visited Oct. 15, 2018). For readers
skeptical of the existence of web-connected batteries, see Roost Wi-Fi Battery for Smoke and
CO Alarms, ROOST, https://www.getroost.com/product-battery [https://perma.cc/TQL7-SKNL]
(last visited Oct. 15, 2018).
76 See CONNECTED CAR INDUSTRY REPORT 2013 9, TELEFONICA (2013), http://websrvc
.net/2013/telefonica/Telefonica%20Digital_Connected_Car2013_Full_Report_English.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A356-4TZU].
77 See THE 2017 VOICE REPORT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 4, VOICELABS.CO (Jan. 15, 2017),
https://s3-us-west-1.amazonaws.com/voicelabs/report/vl-voice-report-exec-summary_final
.pdf [https://perma.cc/79MS-8697].
78 See Anick Jesdanun, Smart Homes: Not Just for Tech Geeks Anymore, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (Dec. 28, 2017), https://apnews.com/af20a3f73e5b41068bbb91cf87e4ee98 [https://
perma.cc/4XX9-TDHZ].
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people are not even aware exist.79 Experts now say data available from existing
smartphone sensors can be used to infer a user’s mood, stress, personality type,
gender, marital status, job status, age, mental illness, smoking habits, physical
activity, and overall movement.80
Fig. 381
Where Justice Stevens saw a “conflict . . . of the highest order” between free
speech and privacy interests,82 the massive growth in communications and data tech-
nologies now overwhelms privacy interests such that revisiting Bartnicki is justified.
Recall the scenario that led to Bartnicki: in 1993, an unknown person tape-recorded
a sensitive cell phone conversation, mailed the cassette to a sympathetic activist, and
the tape was then delivered to radio stations who aired it.83 This series of acts required
substantial motive, premeditation, planning, and execution.
79 See, e.g., Timothy R. Graeff & Susan Harmon, Collecting and Using Personal Data: Con-
sumers’ Awareness and Concerns, 19 J. CONSUMER MKTG. 302 (2002) (showing consumers are
generally unaware how “discount loyalty card” programs track their personal information).
80 See Scott R. Peppet, Regulating the Internet of Things: First Steps Towards Managing
Discrimination, Privacy, Security & Consent, 93 TEX. L. REV. 85, 115–16 (2014).
81 See Fixed Broadband Subscriptions, supra note 66.
82 Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 518 (2001).
83 See id. at 518–19. The history of Wiretap Act litigation reveals another high-profile case
that predates Bartnicki, the procedurally complex Boehner v. McDermott. 191 F.3d 463 (D.C.
Cir. 1999) (upholding judgment against Congressman Jim McDermott, who in 1996 arranged
to acquire a tape of a private wiretap of Congressman John Boehner). Upon the ruling in
Bartnicki, the Supreme Court vacated the D.C. Circuit’s judgment. McDermott v. Boehner,
532 U.S. 1050 (2001). Upon remand, the District Court distinguished Bartnicki because Rep. 
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Now imagine a similar scenario in 2018—how might it play out differently? A
wrongdoer still could audio-record the conversations. Rather than physically deliver a
cassette though, an audio recording can now be digitized and delivered anonymously
in a matter of minutes to an arbitrary number of recipients, to an audience of arbitrary
size and scope.84
Instead of recording the audio of a private conversation, such a modern wrong-
doer could steal and crack a smartphone or computer hack into an email account, hack
into a “cloud” account, hack into a voicemail account, intercept WiFi signal communi-
cations, or “phish” for bank or other personal information.85 Most of this information
is in the custody of some third-party entity other than the subject.86
Notwithstanding illicit hacking, the volume and breadth of personal identifying
information freely available is remarkable. One’s home address is often ascertainable
online.87 Court documents, records, and wills are readily available and easily re-
trievable.88 One’s ancestry and immigration history are discoverable.89 In a recent
case, a journalist was able to easily discover that a prominent Fox News commentator
is the descendant of a North Dakotan man who was accused of lying on his immigration
papers in 1909.90 In March 2017, a journalist needed only four hours using completely
McDermott had knowledge of the illegal wiretap. Boehner v. McDermott, 332 F. Supp. 2d 149
(D.D.C. 2004). The D.C. Circuit later affirmed. Boehner v. McDermott, 484 F.3d 573 (D.C. Cir.
2007). This case illustrates exactly the sort of behavior the Wiretap Act is intended to deter.
84 See, e.g., Tim Nudd, The Story Behind the Pants-Soiling ‘Rings’ Prank That Has 200
Million Views in 24 Hours, ADWEEK (Jan. 24, 2017), http://www.adweek.com/creativity
/story-behind-pants-soiling-rings-prank-has-200-million-views-24-hours-175720/ [https://
perma.cc/5EGX-N8AN] (describing a marketing campaign through which a viral YouTube
video was viewed over 200 million times within a day of uploading).
85 See, e.g., Charles Arthur, Naked Celebrity Hack: Security Experts Focus on iCloud
Backup Theory, GUARDIAN (Sept. 1, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014
/sep/01/naked-celebrity-hack-icloud-backup-jennifer-lawrence [https://perma.cc/U678-FUDV].
86 See id. (discussing how hackers accessed the celebrity photos possibly through iCloud
backups or Dropbox).
87 See Charlie Burton, How to Find Anyone Online, WIRED (May 3, 2017), http://www
.wired.co.uk/article/how-to-find-anyone [https://perma.cc/58RK-J3EK] (explaining how to
track someone’s location online).
88 See, e.g., Last Will and Testament of John F. Kennedy, Jr., https://www.livingtrust
network.com/estate-planning-center/last-will-and-testament/wills-of-the-rich-and-famous
/last-will-and-testament-of-john-kennedy-jr.html [https://perma.cc/WUD7-65DS]. The website
hosts the wills of, among others, Diana, Princess of Wales, Walt Disney, James Gandofini,
Michael Jackson, and Whitney Houston. See Wills of the Rich and Famous, LIVING TRUST
NETWORK, https://www.livingtrustnetwork.com/estate-planning-center/last-will-and-testament
/wills-of-the-rich-and-famous.html [https://perma.cc/744P-HA9N].
89 See, e.g., Jennifer Mendelsohn, Tomi Lahren, Meet The Great Great Grandfather Pros-
ecuted For Forging His Citizenship Papers!, WONKETTE (Sept. 7, 2017, 11:29 AM), https://
wonkette.com/622623/tomi-lahren-meet-the-great-great-grandfather-prosecuted-for-forging
-his-citizenship-papers [https://perma.cc/56ZB-J9NM].
90 See id.
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public, conventional tools and platforms to discover then–FBI Director James Comey’s
pseudonymous Twitter account.91 In October 2017, Comey confirmed the unearthed
account was in fact his.92 Even the Pentagon cannot keep up. In January 2018, an
intelligence analyst was able to use publicly available fitness tracker location data
to map secret military bases in Afghanistan, Syria, the Falkland Islands, and Somalia.93
B. Actual Instances of Compromise and Distribution of Private Information
Are Common
These privacy concerns are hardly theoretical. In 2012, the British newspaper, News
of the World, became embroiled in scandal when it was revealed that journalists were
hacking celebrities’ and politicians’ cell phones, computers, and voicemail inboxes.94
Over twenty journalists were charged with crimes.95 There were countless public
hearings and a major government inquiry into ethical conduct in U.K. journalism.96
While Bartnicki does not apply directly to a circumstance where the thief is also
the publisher,97 under the holding of Bartnicki, in the United States, the News of the
World’s journalists—or any motivated individual—could have laundered the stolen
information, for example, if they had simply passed it to another newspaper.
Countless other specific instances in the past several years illustrate the vulnerability
of private information, including private speech which is published to the detriment
91 Ashley Feinberg, This Is Almost Certainly James Comey’s Twitter Account, GIZMODO
(Mar. 30, 2017), https://gizmodo.com/this-is-almost-certainly-james-comey-s-twitter-account
-1793843641 [https://perma.cc/73UK-RRFY] (“[I]t only took me about four hours of sleuth-
ing to find Comey’s account, which is not protected.”).
92 See Reinhold Niebuhr (@FormerBu), TWITTER (Oct. 23, 2017, 8:34 AM), https://twitter
.com/FormerBu/status/922486295611371526 [https://perma.cc/8SEJ-TSST] (revealing a
photograph of Comey, implying Comey operates the account); Benjamin Wittes (@benjamin
wittes), TWITTER (Oct. 23, 2017, 8:37 AM), https://twitter.com/benjaminwittes/status/9224
87180756385793 [https://perma.cc/5MRM-H566] (personal friend of Comey confirming the
anonymous account @FormerBu belongs to Comey).
93 See Jon Fingas, Strava Fitness Tracking Data Reveals Details of Secret Bases, ENGADGET
(Jan. 28, 2018), https://www.engadget.com/2018/01/28/strava-fitness-tracking-data-reveals
-details-of-secret-bases/ [https://perma.cc/793E-A38P]; Alex Hern, Fitness Tracking App
Strava Gives Away Location of Secret US Army Bases, GUARDIAN (Jan. 28, 2018), https://
www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/28/fitness-tracking-app-gives-away-location-of-secret
-us-army-bases [https://perma.cc/8UDC-2JUL].
94 See Alan Cowell, At British Inquiry, Rupert Murdoch Apologizes Over Scandal, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 26, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/27/world/europe/rupert-murdoch
-testimony-leveson-inquiry-day-2.html?_r=2&hp.
95 Id. (“Twenty . . . have been arrested in separate inquiries into phone and computer
hacking by journalists at News International.”).
96 See The Leveson Inquiry, An Inquiry Into The Culture, Practices and Ethics Of The
Press, U.K. GOV’T (Nov. 2012), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/leveson-in
quiry-report-into-the-culture-practices-and-ethics-of-the-press [https://perma.cc/6U4X-C398].
97 See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 515–16. Justice Stevens explicitly avoids ad-
dressing such a situation. Id.
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of the speaker. In 2008, a “hacker” (of a sort) abused a flaw in a password reset feature
and breached the email account of then-Vice-Presidential nominee and Alaska governor
Sarah Palin.98 The hacker was charged for the hack itself and the obstruction of justice
and eventually sentenced to a year imprisonment.99 In late 2014, a single hacker
breached the iCloud accounts of numerous celebrities, copied privately taken sexually
explicit photographs and videos, and distributed the photographs on several internet
message boards.100 That same year, a group identified as “Guardians of Peace” hacked
the film studio Sony Pictures and leaked email correspondence of executives, em-
ployees, actors, and their families; salary information; complete copies of unreleased
films; and other data.101 And in early 2017, a hacker breached the email account of
celebrity footballer David Beckham and stole personal tax information.102 The
information came into possession of news outlets.103 A U.K. court first enjoined publi-
cation, but later reversed its injunction as moot; the emails had already leaked through
non-U.K. publications.104
98 See M.J. Stephey, Sarah Palin’s E-Mail Hacked, TIME (Sept. 17, 2008), http://content
.time.com/time/politics/article/0,8599,1842097,00.html [https://perma.cc/4AWC-TZXW];
Kim Zetter, Palin E-Mail Hacker Says It Was Easy, WIRED (Sept. 18, 2008), https://www
.wired.com/2008/09/palin-e-mail-ha/ [https://perma.cc/2YZQ-GZRG].
99 See Kim Zetter, Sarah Palin E-Mail Hacker Sentenced to 1 Year in Custody, WIRED
(Nov. 12, 2010), https://www.wired.com/2010/11/palin-hacker-sentenced/ [https://perma.cc
/V36W-MHX6]; Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030; 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (de-
stroying records in a federal investigation is obstruction of justice); Terry Baynes, Sarah
Palin Email Hacker Loses Appeal, REUTERS (Jan. 30, 2012), https://www.reuters.com/article
/us-palin-hacking/sarah-palin-email-hacker-loses-appeal-idUSTRE80T1UQ20120130
[https://perma.cc/6NMM-G4PN]; United States v. Kernell, No. 08-CR-142, 2010 WL3937
421 (E.D. Tenn., Sept. 23, 2010).
100 See Arthur, supra note 85; see also Tom Sykes, Celebrity Nude Photo Hack: Images of
Miley Cyrus, Kristen Stewart, Tiger Woods and More Leak Online, DAILY BEAST (Aug. 22,
2017), https://www.thedailybeast.com/celebrity-nude-photo-hack-images-of-miley-cyrus-kristen
-stewart-tiger-woods-and-more-leak-online [https://perma.cc/3PKZ-CW9D] (describing a simi-
lar mass-theft of sexual photographs in August 2017).
101 Gabi Siboni & David Siman-Tov, Cyberspace Extortion: North Korea Versus the
United States, INSS INSIGHT 646 (Dec. 23, 2014), http://www.inss.org.il/wp-content/uploads
/sites/2/systemfiles/SystemFiles/No.%20646%20-%20Gabi%20and%20Dudi%20for%20
web.pdf [https://perma.cc/5SMC-8TZB]. Most analysts agree the perpetrators were working
for or at the behest of North Korea. Id. See also Michael S. Schmidt et al., F.B.I. Says Little
Doubt North Korea Hit Sony, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01
/08/business/chief-says-fbi-has-no-doubt-that-north-korea-attacked-sony.html.
102 See, e.g., Peter Preston, We Need to Talk About Stolen Goods—And That Includes
Hacked Emails, GUARDIAN (Feb. 12, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/media/2017/feb
/12/beckham-emails-media-law-privacy-hacking-leveson [https://perma.cc/P43N-W5T2]
(“As they stand, any mafia hacker in nether Moscow has a license to trawl through the email
accounts of the rich and famous until they strike gold . . . .”).
103 See id.
104 See id.
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Akin to the “third-party” scenario in Bartnicki, the radical transparency website
Wikileaks has published stolen classified documents and sensitive electronic corre-
spondence in several high-profile cases since 2009. Although it is not known whether
Wikileaks was soliciting or conspiring with the hackers and thieves, they certainly
published information that, consistent with the language of § 2511(1)(c), they knew
or should have known was misappropriated or stolen.105
Wikileaks published the stolen Sarah Palin emails, described previously,106 hun-
dreds of thousands of stolen pager messages sent on September 11, 2001,107 and tens
of thousands of military assessments and State Department cables.108 In 2016, Wiki-
leaks published two massive leaks of private email correspondence: they published
105 See § 2511(1)(c); Charlie Savage, U.S. Tries to Build Case for Conspiracy by WikiLeaks,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/16/world/16wiki.html. Wiki-
leaks launched in late 2006, billing itself as a radical civil libertarian and transparency
organization. See generally DANIEL DOMSCHEIT-BERG, INSIDE WIKILEAKS (Jefferson Chase
trans., Crown Publ’g) (2011). Whatever one’s personal views of Wikileaks’ purported mis-
sion, there is no doubt Wikileaks habitually posts information that was obtained through crim-
inal activity, such as from hacking. See, e.g., Sarah Palin Yahoo Account 2008, WIKILEAKS
(Sept. 17, 2008), https://wikileaks.org/wiki/Sarah_Palin_Yahoo_account_2008 [https://perma
.cc/64QE-BBYX]; Sony Emails, WIKILEAKS (Apr. 16, 2015), https://wikileaks.org/sony
/emails/ [https://perma.cc/ZC7P-8DWN].
106 See Sarah Palin Yahoo Account 2008, supra note 105; M.J. Stephey, Sarah Palin’s E-
Mail Hacked; Kim Zetter, Palin E-Mail Hacker Says It Was Easy, supra note 98.
107 See 9/11 Pager Data, WIKILEAKS (Nov. 25, 2009), https://911.wikileaks.org/ [https://
perma.cc/NM7C-AWAY]; Jennifer Millman, Analysis of 9/11 Pager Data Paints Chilling
Picture, NBC NEWS (Dec. 1, 2009), https://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/Analysis-of
-911-Pager-Data-Paints-Chilling-Picture-78219132.html [https://perma.cc/4U3K-2PHX].
The thief of the pager messages has still not been identified. See Evan Hansen, Manning-
Lamo Chat Logs Revealed, WIRED (July 13, 2011), https://www.wired.com/2011/07/manning
-lamo-logs/ [https://perma.cc/TD8P-JY28]. Logs suggest the pager messages were stolen
from an NSA database. Id.
108 See Baghdad War Diary, WIKILEAKS (Oct. 22, 2010), https://wikileaks.org/irq/ [https://
perma.cc/5SKQ-2VV2]; SPIEGEL Staff, Greatest Data Leak in US Military History, DER
SPIEGEL (Oct. 22, 2010, 10:52 PM), http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/the-wikileaks
-iraq-war-logs-greatest-data-leak-in-us-military-history-a-724845.html [https://perma.cc/RP
J2-GDAU]. In January 2010, United States Army intelligence analyst, presently known as
Chelsea E. Manning, see Verónica Bayetti Flores, Manning Announces She is Transitioning,
FEMINISTING (Aug. 22, 2013), http://feministing.com/2013/08/22/manning-announces-she-is
-transitioning/ [https://perma.cc/VYA3-ETE4], downloaded classified documents and videos,
and on February 3, 2010 passed the information to Wikileaks; Memorandum (author classified),
Statement in Support of Providence Inquiry—U.S. v. Private First Class (PFC) Bradley E.
Manning (U), Jan. 29, 2013. Manning continued to pass additional documents to Wikileaks
over the following weeks. See Steven Lee Myers, Charges for Soldier Accused of Leak, N.Y.
TIMES (July 6, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/07/world/middleeast/07wikileaks
.html. From this leak, between February 18, 2010 and September 1, 2011, Wikileaks gradually
published U.S. government profiles of foreign leaders and diplomats; a video of a July 12,
2007 airstrike in Iraq which killed and injured journalists and civilians; 91,731 classified
Afghanistan War military reports; 391,832 classified Iraq War military reports; 251,287 State
Department cables; and 779 classified Guantánamo Bay files.
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thousands of Democratic National Committee documents, and, separately, thousands
of emails from the personal Gmail account of Hillary Clinton’s presidential campaign
chairman, John Podesta.109
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that Wikileaks was only a passive recipient
(and notwithstanding jurisdictional issues), under Bartnicki, the victims of these
hacks, such as Podesta, would almost certainly have no recourse against Wikileaks
under the Wiretap Act to prevent or seek compensation for publication of these
private communications.110
Notwithstanding these specific examples of communications breach, data also
show significant number of data breaches against the public generally. In 2015,
Americans suffered approximately 3 million economic cybercrimes.111 The European
Union, meanwhile, estimates 12 percent of European Union citizens have experienced
personal online fraud.112
Not all of the above examples necessarily implicate the Bartnicki holding directly.
However, these examples illustrate that thefts of stored electronic communications
and subsequent publication are already a serious problem.
C. Breaches and Thefts Are Likely to Continue as New Software Vulnerabilities
Come to Light Regularly
New vulnerabilities and security flaws seem to come to light every week.
Software firms have a powerful incentive to develop and sell products to the public
109 Specifically, on July 22, 2016, Wikileaks published 19,252 emails and 8,034 email
attachments, which had been exchanged between seven Democratic National Committee
senior staff members between January 2015 and May 2016. Then, beginning October 7, 2016,
Wikileaks began publishing nearly 20,000 private emails from Podesta’s account. Investi-
gators determined that Podesta’s email account had been compromised through a “phishing”
attack in March 2016. See Raphael Satter, Inside Story: How Russians Hacked the Democrats’
Emails, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Nov. 4, 2017), https://www.apnews.com/dea73efc01594839957
c3c9a6c962b8a [https://perma.cc/CSP5-WC8N]. The United States has been specifically
investigating throughout this period since 2009 whether Wikileaks was a passive recipient of
misappropriated information, or actively soliciting or conspiring. See Savage, supra note 105.
110 See Bryan Burrough, Sarah Ellison & Suzanna Andrews, The Snowden Saga: A
Shadowland of Secrets and Light, VANITY FAIR (May 2014), https://www.vanityfair.com
/news/politics/2014/05/edward-snowden-politics-interview [https://perma.cc/5AW6-W9VN];
see also Opening Brief in Support of Defendant Donald J. Trump for President, Inc.’s Motion
to Dismiss, Cockrum v. Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., No. 3:18-cv-00484 at 4–9 (E.D.
Va. Oct. 8, 2018), ECF No. 23 (arguing the First Amendment, as interpreted in Bartnicki,
protects the Trump Campaign’s reproduction and dissemination of stolen DNC emails).
111 Michael Levi, Assessing the Trends, Scale and Nature of Economic Cybercrimes:
Overview and Issues, 67 CRIME L. SOC. CHANGE 3, 11 (2017). Levi argues United States
cybercrime data collection and reporting is grossly inadequate “as if the nation was stuck in
the Dillinger Days.” Id. The FBI received 288,012 cybercrime complaints in 2015, and the
FBI estimates fewer than 10 percent of victims report cybercrimes, meaning one could infer
Americans suffered about 3 million cybercrimes in 2015. See id.
112 Id. at 5.
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but little incentive to discover and patch vulnerabilities which are very difficult and
expensive to find.113 In many cases, the developer no longer exists or has discontinued
product support.114
Hackers, on the other hand, are innumerable and possess a major incentive to
search for vulnerabilities. So-called “zero day” flaws are those discovered but of which
the software developer is unaware.115 For example, residential and commercial WiFi
routers connect to users’ personal devices on what is typically an encrypted local area
network, or WLAN.116 The encryption standard called Wireless Equivalent Privacy
(WEP) is still available on most wireless routers (not generally by default setting).117
However, as early as October 2000,118 serious flaws with WEP were discovered.119
In the wake of the WEP failure, the wireless encryption standard was replaced
with Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) and later WPA2,120 which developed a “gold
113 See Stephen Kampff, Should We Be Paying for Firmware Updates?, FSTOPPERS
(Jan. 10, 2017), https://fstoppers.com/originals/should-we-be-paying-firmware-updates-161
007 [https://perma.cc/K9YB-XD25].
114 When unsupported software is maintained by private users in the public, it has its own
name: “abandonware.” See, e.g., Brad King, Abandonware: Dead Games Live On, WIRED
(Jan. 19, 2002, 2:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2002/01/abandonware-dead-games-live
-on/ [https://perma.cc/5R9F-ZE2R]. After Microsoft discontinued product support for
Windows 98, fans in the user community privately developed and launched their own soft-
ware patches. See Hans-Christian Dirscherl, Nicht tot zu Kriegen: Win 98 Service Pack 2.1
[Not to be Killed: Win 98 Service Pack 2.1], PC WELT (Nov. 29, 2005, 10:24 AM), https://
www.pcwelt.de/news/Nicht-tot-zu-kriegen-Win-98-Service-Pack-2-1-402036.html
[https://perma.cc/J8P7-CD8W].
115 See How Do Zero-Day Vulnerabilities Work: #30SecTech, SYMANTEC SECURITY CTR.,
https://us.norton.com/internetsecurity-emerging-threats-how-do-zero-day-vulnerabilities
-work-30sectech.html [https://perma.cc/J5G2-AMNF] (last visited Oct. 15, 2018); see also
Kim Zetter, Hacker Lexicon, What is a Zero Day?, WIRED (Nov. 11, 2014, 6:30 AM), https://
www.wired.com/2014/11/what-is-a-zero-day/ [https://perma.cc/97VD-CZXN].
116 See Dong Ngo, Home Networking: Everything You Need to Know, CNET (Feb. 15,
2017, 11:31 AM), https://www.cnet.com/how-to/home-networking-explained-part-1-heres
-the-url-for-you/ [https://perma.cc/K2GJ-PFJA].
117 See Michael Horowitz, WiFi Over-The-Air Encryption: WEP, WPA and WPA2, ROUTER
SECURITY (July 13, 2015), https://routersecurity.org/wepwpawpa2.php [https://perma.cc
/G5K9-LGXW].
118 Wireless Research, UNIV. MD., http://www.cs.umd.edu/~waa/wireless.html [https://
perma.cc/F9X2-95A3] (last visited Oct. 15, 2018).
119 See Security of the WEP Algorithim, http://www.isaac.cs.berkeley.edu/isaac/wep-faq
.html [https://perma.cc/ZT54-6KYK] (last visited Oct. 15, 2018); see also Kevin Beaver et
al., Understanding WEP Weaknesses, DUMMIES.COM, http://www.dummies.com/program
ming/networking/understanding-wep-weaknesses/ [https://perma.cc/97BV-7EYP]; Gina
Trapani, How to Crack a Wi-Fi Network’s WEP Password with BackTrack, LIFEHACKER
(Oct. 28, 2011), https://lifehacker.com/5305094/how-to-crack-a-wi-fi-networks-wep-pass
word-with-backtrack [https://perma.cc/4EVT-EKU7] (describing a simple software tool for
automatically hacking WEP-encrypted WLANs).
120 See Horowitz, supra note 117.
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standard” reputation for residential and commercial network encryption.121 However,
it was revealed in October 2017 that, like WEP before it, WPA2 is catastrophically
flawed and easily hacked.122 Since the replacement of WEP, tens of millions of
WPA/WPA2-encrypted devices entered the market.123 This flaw is likely to precipitate
numerous breaches.124
In April 2014, a major security flaw in OpenSSL (the secure communications
software that connects most computers to servers on the internet) was uncovered.125
Known as “Heartbleed,” the bug existed in the software for a full two years before it
121 Id.
122 Lily Hay Newman, The ‘Secure’ Wi-Fi Standard Has a Huge, Dangerous Flaw,
WIRED (Oct. 16, 2017, 11:03 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/krack-wi-fi-wpa2-vulnera
bility/ [https://perma.cc/9M4M-94GB].
123 Id.
124 Such flawed WLAN security has already proven a serious danger. In 2007, the WLAN
of retailer TJX Companies, Inc., which operates T.J. Maxx, Marshalls, and HomeGoods
stores (among others) was breached, and 96 million credit card accounts were stolen. See
Kim Zetter, TJX Failed to Notice Thieves Moving 80-Gbytes of Data on Its Network, WIRED
(Oct. 26, 2017,10:18 AM), https://www.wired.com/2007/10/tjx-failed-to-n/ [https://perma.cc
/F6N4-HGB9]. The estimated number affected was dramatically revised over the course of
investigation. See Jaikumar Vijayan, TJX Data Breach: At 45.6M Card Numbers, It’s the
Biggest Ever, COMPUTERWORLD (Mar. 29, 2007, 1:00 PM), https://www.computerworld.com
/article/2544306/security0/tjx-data-breach--at-45-6m-card-numbers--it-s-the-biggest-ever
.html [https://perma.cc/26U3-2DV7]. Hackers were able to wirelessly install “sniffer” soft-
ware on TJX’s systems using a high-gain antenna mounted to their vehicle, from a distance
and without physically handling any TJX hardware inside the stores. See Indictment at 3–5,
United States v. Gonzalez, No. 08-CR-10223 (D. Mass. Aug. 8, 2008); see also Antenna
Theory for Wardriving and Penetration Testing, INFOSEC INST. (Jan. 22, 2015), https://
resources.infosecinstitute.com/antenna-theory-wardriving-penetration-testing/#gref [https://
perma.cc/S28L-49LU]. The hackers’ malware captured credit card data as it passed through
TJX’s network. The hackers were able to easily download customers’ names, addresses, so-
cial security numbers, and payment card data. See In the Matter of The TJX Companies, Inc.,
No. 072-3055, 2008 WL 3150421, at *2 (F.T.C. 2008). TJX ultimately agreed to a consent
order with the federal government, and settled law suits with a class of consumer and with
41 states. See W.J. Hennigan, TJX Agrees to Pay $9.75 Million to Forty-One States in Data
Breach Case, L.A. TIMES (June 24, 2009), http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jun/24/business
/fi-tjx24 [https://perma.cc/XC6P-Z83Z]; see also Mike Barris, TJX, MasterCard to Settle
Data Breach Lawsuit, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 2, 2008), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB12071
5754287583743 [https://perma.cc/8655-KMKD].
125 OpenSSL Heartbleed Vulnerability, PUB. SAFETY CAN. (Apr. 11, 2014), https://www
.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/cybr-ctr/2014/al14-005-en.aspx [https://perma.cc/MZ35-2TC4].
The Canadian government discovered the flaw after personal identifying information of 900
Canadian taxpayers was stolen from a government database. Pete Evans, Heartbleed Bug:
RCMP Asked Revenue Canada to Delay News of SIN Thefts, CBC NEWS (Apr. 14, 2014,
8:40 AM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/business/heartbleed-bug-rcmp-asked-revenue-canada-to
-delay-news-of-sin-thefts-1.2609192 [https://perma.cc/V5J7-KP2K].
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was discovered and patched.126 The Heartbleed flaw would allow a hacker to capture
packets of unencrypted data, typically passwords. Affected websites included Yahoo!,
Imgur, Pinterest, Reddit, and Tumblr.127
Several other high profile large-scale system breaches due to hidden flaws have
been in the news recently:
• In 2011, PlayStation Network was hacked in what was then one of the
largest breaches in history, in which 77 million accounts were compro-
mised, and Sony’s network downed for 23 days.128
• In June 2015, the United States Office of Personnel Management was
breached and personal information of 22.1 million current and former
federal government employees stolen.129
• In July 2015, a hacker group stole over 25 gigabytes of data from Ashley
Madison, an online dating website designed for enabling extramarital
affairs.130 The hackers published thousands of lines of user data, includ-
ing real names, addresses, and credit card information.131
• In late 2016, it was determined that internet service company Yahoo!
had been massively breached twice, in August 2013 and in late 2014,
compromising the data of all three billion Yahoo! users’ accounts.132
126 R. Seggelmann, M. Tuexen & M. Williams, Transport Layer Security (TLS) and
Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Heartbeat Extension, RFC EDITOR (Feb. 2012),
https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6520.txt [doi:10.17487|do:10.17487|RFC6520] [https://
perma.cc/557J-TAKS] (describing the extensions to OpenSSL framework that were later
discovered in April 2014 to be severely flawed).
127 Jason Cipriani, Heartbleed Bug: Check Which Sites Have Been Patched, CNET (Apr. 9,
2014, 2:54 AM), https://www.cnet.com/how-to/which-sites-have-patched-the-heartbleed
-bug/ [https://perma.cc/NX7N-YPAD] (listing the top 100 most-visited sites on the internet
and whether they were affected by Heartbleed, and whether they had been patched as of the
date of publication).
128 See Letter from Kazuo Hirai, Chairman of the Board of Directors, Sony Computer En-
tertainment America, to the Honorable Mary Bono Mack and the Honorable K.G. Butterfield,
Subcommittee on Commerce, Manufacturing, and Trade (May 3, 2011), copy available at
https://www.flickr.com/photos/playstationblog/5687531722/in/album-72157626521862165/
[https://perma.cc/U8DG-M59A].
129 See Ellen Nakashima, Hacks of OPM Databases Compromised 22.1 Million People,
Federal Authorities Say, WASH. POST (July 9, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news
/federal-eye/wp/2015/07/09/hack-of-security-clearance-system-affected-21-5-million-people
-federal-authorities-say [https://perma.cc/86WG-9N25].
130 See Simon Thomsen, Extramarital Affair Website Ashley Madison Has Been Hacked
and Attackers Are Threatening to Leak Data Online, BUSINESS INSIDER (July 20, 2015, 4:31
AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/cheating-affair-website-ashley-madison-hacked-user
-data-leaked-2015-7 [https://perma.cc/2XHH-CYU7].
131 Id.
132 See Robert McMillan & Ryan Knutson, Yahoo Triples Estimate of Breached Accounts
to 3 Billion, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 3, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/yahoo-triples-estimate
-of-breached-accounts-to-3-billion-1507062804 [https://perma.cc/MXQ4-XX2P].
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• In July 2016, at least 143 million consumer financial records were stolen
from Equifax, a credit ratings agency.133 The hackers had exploited a
vulnerability in Equifax’s consumer dispute portal.134 News outlets re-
ported in February 2018 that the Equifax breach also included tax
information and drivers’ license data.135
• In October 2017, the security firm Kaspersky Labs revealed the existence
of security flaws in nine popular online dating sites and apps that allow
a hacker to determine a user’s real name and location, view photographs,
determine page views, and read messages.136 The potential for extortion
and public embarrassment is obvious.
The point of these various examples is not to frighten the reader, but rather to
exemplify the reality that billions of private communications change hands each day,
and that the systems through which we communicate are almost certainly vulnerable
to eavesdropping and theft. The volume and availability of stolen communications
will be far greater in 2018 and beyond than when Bartnicki was decided in 2001.137
133 See Lee Mathews, Equifax Data Breach Impacts 143 Million Americans, FORBES
(Sept. 7, 2017, 10:42 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/leemathews/2017/09/07/equifax
-data-breach-impacts-143-million-americans/ [https://perma.cc/9QX7-NQPF].
134 See id.; Donna Borak & Kathryn Vasel, The Equifax Hack Could Be Worse Than We
Thought, CNN MONEY (Feb. 10, 2018, 10:43 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2018/02/09/pf/equi
fax-hack-senate-disclosure/index.html [https://perma.cc/96A6-2D6B].
135 See Borak & Vasel, supra note 134.
136 See Roman Unuchek, Mikhail Kuzen & Sergey Zelenoky, Dangerous Liaisons: In-
vestigating the Security of Online Dating Apps, SECURELIST (Oct. 24, 2017, 9:00 AM),
https://securelist.com/dangerous-liaisons/ [https://perma.cc/9PF4-X7UT] (describing research
regarding network vulnerabilities of Android and iOS versions of nine online dating apps).
Id. (“We’re talking here about intercepting and stealing personal information and the de-
anonymization of a dating service that could cause victims no end of troubles—from messages
being sent out in their names to blackmail.”). For an anecdote about the volume and breadth
of data dating sites and apps maintain from their users, see Judith Duportail, I Asked Tinder
for My Data. It Sent Me 800 Pages of My Deepest, Darkest Secrets, GUARDIAN (Sept. 26,
2017, 02:10 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/sep/26/tinder-personal-data
-dating-app-messages-hacked-sold [https://perma.cc/XT97-RYWV] (describing a dossier
containing details on, among other things, author’s Facebook “likes”; Facebook friends;
Instagram photos; education; employment history; romantic preferences; sexual preferences;
musical tastes; and time, duration, location, and content of conversations).
137 See, e.g., Dan O’Sullivan, Dark Cloud: Inside the Pentagon’s Leaked Internet Surveil-
lance Archive, UPGUARD (Apr. 30, 2018), https://www.upguard.com/breaches/cloud-leak
-centcom [https://perma.cc/ECN7-ZUTJ] (describing how the Department of Defense collected
about 1.8 billion social media posts and inadvertently stored them on public Amazon cloud
servers open to worldwide inspection) (“[T]his disparate collection of data appears to con-
stitute an ingestion engine for the bulk collection of internet posts—organizing a mass
quantity of data into a searchable form.”).
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Even the Department of Defense could not anticipate and account for all the data they
were sharing.138
The Court must take this reality into account when considering what legal tools
legislatures should have at their disposal to deter and interdict stolen communications
and punish their publication.
D. Evidence Suggests the Public Generally Values Privacy Interests, But That
People Are Poor at Assessing Risk and Protecting Themselves
With a rising volume of communications and a range of risks set forth above,
one might expect the public to adjust habits and protect themselves. These risks would
be theoretically mitigated if communicants were to adjust their behavior accordingly.
However, evidence suggests Americans reasonably lack the ability to shield them-
selves from such data exposure and view loss of information privacy as futile.139
Recent polling found 93 percent of adults said controlling who accessed information
about them was important.140 Ninety-one percent of adults agreed that consumers had
“lost control” of their personal information.141 Eighty percent were concerned about how
third parties accessed and exploited personal data.142 Eighty-eight percent agreed “that
it would be very difficult to remove inaccurate information about them from online.”143
Eighty-one percent of surveyed adults considered their personal health informa-
tion sensitive;144 81 percent considered content of telephone conversations sensitive;145
77% considered content of email messages sensitive;146 75% considered content of
text messages sensitive;147 75% considered numbers dialed or texted sensitive;148 and
even 66 % considered their birthdate sensitive information.149 Sixty-one percent of
surveyed adults wanted some form of a “right to be forgotten” whereby citizens can
command websites and search engines to delete personal information.150
138 See Hern, supra note 93.
139 See infra notes 141–53.
140 Mary Madden & Lee Rainie, Americans’ Attitudes About Privacy, Security and Sur-
veillance, PEW RES. CTR. (May 20, 2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/05/20/americans
-attitudes-about-privacy-security-and-surveillance/ [https://perma.cc/P9T4-X5HM] (detailing
that 74% out of the 93% considered such control “very important”).
141 Mary Madden, Public Perceptions of Privacy and Security in the Post-Snowden Era,
PEW INTERNET RES. (Nov. 12, 2014), http://www.pewinternet.org/2014/11/12/public-pri
vacy-perceptions/ [https://perma.cc/8WC4-JQ59].
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 U.S. Attitudes Toward the ‘Right to Be Forgotten,’ SOFTWARE ADVICE (2014), https://
2018] ADAPTING BARTNICKI V. VOPPER 271
Despite the expressed concerns, only 30 % of surveyed adults said they had taken
at least one step to hide or shield their information.151 Fifty-four percent considered
it would be “somewhat” or “very” difficult to find tools or use strategies to aid them
in becoming more private online or when they used their cell phones.152
Studies have also shown consumers are poor at weighing available information
to assess privacy risks associated with third-party mobile apps.153 Internet users are
not particularly risk averse in their online activities.154 Qualitative investigation (i.e.,
subject interviews) has suggested that generally the layperson public only has a vague
idea of the architecture of the internet and cell phone networks, and laypeople do not
understand well where their data goes and who has access to such data.155
The volume and range of information privacy risks have increased dramatically since
2001. Importantly, the public is only vaguely aware of and ill-prepared for the full extent
and contours of such risks. The Supreme Court should take this reality into account.
III. THE SUPREME COURT OFTEN REASSESSES ITS HOLDINGS AND
PRINCIPLES AS TECHNOLOGY EVOLVES
It is not generally remarkable for the Court to reverse itself or reframe a constitu-
tional question. And the more specific proposition that the Supreme Court should
revisit, reverse, or relax its doctrine because of changes in technology is neither far-
fetched nor new. Sometimes new technology can fit into existing doctrine.156 But new
www.softwareadvice.com/security/industryview/right-to-be-forgotten-2014/ [https://perma
.cc/U6JQ-C8PV].
151 Lee Rainie & Mary Madden, Americans’ Privacy Strategies Post-Snowden, PEW RES.
CTR. (Mar. 16, 2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/03/16/americans-privacy-strategies
-post-snowden/ [https://perma.cc/8M8W-359T].
152 Id.
153 See Pern Hui Chia, Yusuke Yamamoto & N. Asokan, Is This App Safe?: A Large Scale
Study on Application Permissions and Risk Signals, Proceedings of the 21st Int’l Conference
on World Wide Web 311 Apr. 16–20, 2012, Lyon, France [doi> 10.1145|2187836.2187879].
154 See Joshua Fogel & Elham Nehmad, Internet Social Network Communities: Risk Taking,
Trust, and Privacy Concerns, 25 COMPUTERS IN HUM. BEHAV. 153 (2009). For a technocratic
legal approach to Internet of Things privacy issues see Rolf H. Weber, Internet of Things:
Privacy Issues Revisited, 31 COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REV. 618 (2015).
155 See Ruogu Kang et al., “My Data Just Goes Everywhere”: User Mental Models of the
Internet and Implications for Privacy and Security, 2015 SYMPOSIUM ON USABLE PRIVACY
& SECURITY 39 (2015). The study found that users who have more technical knowledge of
the internet tend to understand privacy risks better than laypeople. Id. at 43–46.
156 For an example of explicit judicial pushback on the idea that technology should
specifically affect the law, see Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse,
1996 U. CHI. L. FORUM 207 (1996) (considering “cyberspace law” to be “multidisciplinary
dilettantism” and suggesting lawyers and judges simply apply existing sound legal principles
to new technology).
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technology inevitably exerts pressure on the law.157 Whether the Justices admit it or
not, the Court has a long history of revisiting, refining, and (occasionally) reversing
itself in response to changing technosocial realities.158
Every so often, the Court will openly concede that then-existing doctrine is not
equipped to handle modern circumstances, precipitating a legal paradigm shift.159
Whether slow or rapid, many areas of the law have proven susceptible to changes
in technology available to the public or to the government. For instance, famously,
the Court was compelled in 1945 to scrap and reform its personal jurisdiction frame-
work.160 As any first-year law student knows, in its 1878 holding in Pennoyer v.
Neff,161 the Court articulated its view of a sovereign’s personal jurisdiction over a
defendant.162 The nineteenth-century Pennoyer view was that courts of law or equity,
in accordance with the Due Process clause,163 could only exercise jurisdiction over
persons or property actually present within the jurisdiction’s sovereign territory, or
over persons who otherwise consented.164 This formalistic concept of sovereign juris-
diction befitted a horse-and-buggy age where wire communication was limited.165
157 See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. CarMax, Inc., 165 F.3d 1047, 1057 (6th Cir. 1999)
(Jones, J., concurring) (suggesting in light of technological change that courts reconsider
doctrine of the geographic scope of trademark rights) (“[G]iven that recent technological
innovations such as the Internet are increasingly deconstructing geographical barriers for
marketing purposes, it appears to me that a reexamination of precedents would be timely.”).
158 But see Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786 (2011) (holding video games
sales to minors are protected under First Amendment principles, and invalidating a content-
based ratings system for video games). Justice Scalia wrote for the majority in Entertainment
Merchants, but note that Scalia joined the dissent in Bartnicki. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S.
514, 541 (2001) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). For more on Entertainment Merchants, see
infra Part IV.
159 See generally THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1st ed.
1962) (proposing a now famous theoretical model for widespread adoption of new ideas, for
example the heliocentric model of our solar system).
160 See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (introducing the idea of
personal jurisdiction based on “minimum contacts”).
161 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
162 Id. at 727 (“Process from the tribunals of one State cannot run into another State, and sum-
mon parties there domiciled to leave its territory and respond to proceedings against them.”).
163 U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law . . . .”).
164 Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 729 (mentioning “voluntary appearance” as allowing valid
exercise of personal jurisdiction).
165 The earliest electrical telegraphy communications systems were implemented in 1837
in England. See LEWIS COE, THE TELEGRAPH: A HISTORY OF MORSE’S INVENTION AND ITS
PREDECESSORS IN THE UNITED STATES 15 (1993). By the time Pennoyer was decided in 1878,
there were several transatlantic telegraph lines in operation and some transcontinental ones
too. However, the American west was substantially unconnected. See G.W. & C.B. Colton
& Co., Map Showing the Telegraph Lines In Operation, Under Contract, and Contemplated
to Complete the Circuit of the Globe (c. 1870–71), LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, http://hdl.loc.gov
/loc.gmd/g3201p.ct001637 [https://perma.cc/M56S-Q43V] (last visted Oct. 15, 2018).
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The Pennoyer decision barely postdated the first telephone,166 and long predated the
radio,167 and the automobile.168
Over successive decades, with the advent of new communications technology,
massive multistate and multinational corporations, and rapid transit, it became fun-
damentally impracticable to adhere to the formalism of Pennoyer. With increased
mobility of persons and goods, the Court strained itself to expand principles of con-
sent to the point approaching absurdity and stretch other legal mechanisms such as
quasi-in-rem jurisdiction.169
Finally, in 1945 the realities of the day compelled the Court to discard its formalist
framework. In International Shoe Co. v. Washington,170 the Court set up a functionalist
framework based on a party’s “certain minimum contacts” with the forum territory.171
Subsequent developments in personal jurisdiction doctrine have relied on abstract
concepts such as “stream of commerce” suited to the present day.172
The Court had no choice but to adjust its views on personal jurisdiction as tech-
nology caused changes in society. Recently, courts have struggled with the notions
of venue and personal jurisdiction in matters of wrongdoing in cyberspace.173 Courts
166 See Joan Brodsky Schur, Telephone & Light Patent Drawings, U.S. NAT’L ARCHIVES,
https://www.archives.gov/education/lessons/telephone-light-patents [https://perma.cc/VR73
-AVQ6] (last updated Sept. 7, 2016); see also U.S. Patent. No. 174,465 (issued Mar. 7,1876).
167 See Prabir K. Bondyopadhyay, Guglielmo Marconi—The Father of Long Distance
Radio Communication: An Engineer’s Tribute, 25th European Microwave Conference Sept. 4,
1995, Bologna, Italy [doi: 10.1109|EUMA.1995.337090]. Marconi invented the first radio
communications apparatus around 1900.
168 The first commercially available internal-combustion automobiles appeared in the mid-
1890s. See Company History: Benz Patent Motor Car: The First Automobile (1885–1886)
DAIMLER, https://www.daimler.com/company/tradition/company-history/1885-1886.html
[https://perma.cc/U6E2-ZDHV] (last visited Oct. 15, 2018). Ford Motor Co. sold its first
commercial automobile in 1903, and first sold its famed Model T in 1908. See Our History,
FORD MOTOR CO., https://corporate.ford.com/history.html [https://perma.cc/HV4N-S7EP]
(last visited Oct. 15, 2018).
169 See, e.g., Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356 (1927) (driving a motor vehicle into
Massachusetts sufficient to consent to personal jurisdiction and appointment of agent for
service of process); see also Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623, 627–28
(1935) (upholding personal jurisdiction over company whose agents were selling securities
in forum state); Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905) (a court can assume quasi-in-rem
jurisdiction over a defendant wherever her debtors can be found).
170 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
171 Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
172 See J. McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 879 (2011); Asahi Metal Indus.
Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 105 (1987); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); see also Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958) (providing
a good overview of in rem jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction).
173 See, e.g., Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre le Racisme et L’Antisémitisme, 433 F.3d 1199
(9th Cir. 2006) (confirming that the district court did have personal jurisdiction, although a
close call, over French association (LICRA), but due to ripeness concerns, decision in favor of
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have generally refused to permit the physical location of servers to shield United
States–based actors from liability.174 However, in February 2018, the Supreme Court
heard argument in Microsoft Corp. v. United States,175 a case that again forced it to
confront the realities of the twenty-first century. There, the petitioners asked the Court
to address whether the federal government can, through a lawful request, exercise
control over data held on a server not located in United States territory.176 About a
month after oral argument, Congress passed the CLOUD Act, clarifying the issue
and mooting the case.177 Still, Microsoft illustrates how courts have and will continue
to confront technological shifts that are poorly suited to existing law. Whether through
the courts or legislature, the law must adjust.
Yahoo! was reversed and case remanded to the district court to dismiss without prejudice). In
principle, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court’s refusal to enforce a French judgment
in California for the online auction of Nazi memorabilia which, under French Law, was illegal.
See id. See also United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D 449 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (charging defendant
with violations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act in the Central District of California,
although both defendant and victim were residents of Missouri, because the allegedly violative
communications passed through servers physically located in California). For a discussion
on jurisdictional issues relating to web-based activity, see Teresa Scassa & Robert J. Currie,
New First Principles? Assessing the Internet’s Challenges to Jurisdiction, 42 GEO. J. INT’L
L. 1017 (2011).
174 For examples of cases where courts have found jurisdiction over servers hosting illegal
gambling activity, see United States v. America Sports Ltd., 286 F.3d 641 (3d Cir. 2002);
United States v. Ross, No. 98 CR. 1174-1(KMV), 1999 WL 782749, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16,
1999); People v. World Interactive Gaming Corp., 714 N.Y.S.2d 844 (Sup. Ct. 1999).
175 138 S. Ct. 1186 (2018).
176 The question that confronted the Supreme Court in Microsoft was whether a corpora-
tion must comply with a government request under the Stored Communications Act by
disclosing electronic communications within that corporation’s control, even if the electronic
data is stored on server geographically outside the United States. See In re Warrant to Search
a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and Maintained by Microsoft Corp., 829 F.3d 197 (2d
Cir. 2016), cert. granted, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 136 S. Ct. 356 (2017). The case
was ultimately mooted by an act of Congress. See United States v. Microsoft, 138 S. Ct. 1186
(2018); see also infra note 177. While the legal issue in this case was jurisdictional, the fac-
tual predicate the Court was asked to weigh in on was novel technology. See also Transcript
of Oral Argument at 6, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186 (2018) (No. 17-2)
(“I think the starting point, all would agree, in . . . 1986, no one ever heard of clouds. This
kind of storage didn’t exist.”); Amy Howe, Argument Preview: Old Laws, New Technology
and National Borders, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 21, 2018, 10:45 AM), http://www.scotusblog
.com/2018/02/argument-preview-old-laws-new-technology-national-borders/ [https://perma.cc
/7DQZ-BLS4] (“In 1986, when Congress passed the Stored Communications Act, the World
Wide Web did not yet exist . . . the justices will consider a question that Congress likely
didn’t think about 32 years ago.”); Steve Nickelsburg et al., Overseas Data Seizures—U.S.
Supreme Court Hears Oral Argument, But Congress Might Get to the Issue First, CLIFFORD
CHANCE (Mar. 2018), https://www.cliffordchance.com/briefings/2018/03/overseas_data_sei
zuresussupremecourthear.html [https://perma.cc/EM25-92C5].
177 Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data (CLOUD) Act, H.R. 4943, 115th Cong.
(2018) (enacted).
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Technosocial change has perhaps impacted no area of constitutional jurisprudence
more than the Fourth Amendment search and seizure doctrine.178 Early developments
in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence were rooted in property law, interpreting a search
or seizure as akin to a common-law trespass on property.179 In 1928, in Olmstead v.
United States,180 a divided Court held a wiretap of a public phone not to be a search
or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment because there was not a tres-
pass on private property.181 In dissent, Justice Brandeis gave eloquent voice to the
specific proposition that technology must inevitably shape constitutional law:
Since [McCulloch v. Maryland]182 this [C]ourt has repeatedly sus-
tained the exercise of power by Congress, under various clauses
of [the Constitution], over objects of which the fathers could not
have dreamed . . . . Clauses guaranteeing to the individual protec-
tion against specific abuses of power must have a . . . capacity
of adaptation to a changing world.183
178 See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33–34 (2001) (“It would be foolish to
contend that the degree of privacy secured to citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been
entirely unaffected by the advance of technology.”); City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746,
759 (2010) (“Rapid changes in the dynamics of communication and information transmission
are evident not just in technology itself but in what society accepts as proper behavior.”). For
perspectives on the impact of technology on Fourth Amendment jurisprudence see Katherine
J. Strandburg, Home, Home on the Web and Other Fourth Amendment Implications of Tech-
nosocial Change, 70 MD. L. REV. 614 (2011) (arguing Fourth Amendment protections are
impossible to disentangle from technological and social factors and should extend beyond the
physical home to a citizen’s online presence); Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New
Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801 (2004)
(arguing that legislatures are better equipped than courts to adjust constitutional principles
to emerging technologies); Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth
Amendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1086 (2002) (arguing that Fourth Amendment
doctrine does not protect privacy sufficiently against new technologies, and that Fourth Amend-
ment law should create an “architecture of power” to maintain an appropriate balance of
power among individuals, institutions, and the government in light of “the ever-increasing
data flows of the Information Age”). For an overview of search and seizure doctrine in the
early twentieth century, see Hugh E. Willis, Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 4 IND. L.
J. 311 (1928).
179 See Solove, supra note 178, at 1122 (“The Court originally conceptualized privacy in
physical terms as protecting tangible property or preventing trespasses.”) (internal citations
omitted).
180 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
181 Id. at 464–65 (“There was no searching. There was no seizure. The evidence was
secured by the use of the sense of hearing and that only. There was no entry of the houses
or offices of the defendants . . . [T]he language of the [Fourth] Amendment can not be
extended and expanded to include telephone wires . . . .”).
182 17 U.S. (4. Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) (“[W]e must never forget, that it is a constitution
we are expounding.”).
183 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 472 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
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In 1967, as Justice Brandeis foreshadowed, the Court reversed Olmstead in Katz
v. United States, holding that a warrantless wiretap of a phone booth violated Fourth
Amendment guarantees.184 Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, eschewed rote
principles of trespass on property.185 Declaring “the Fourth Amendment protects
people, not places,”186 Katz set forth what later courts adopted as the now-famous
“reasonable expectation of privacy” test.187
In principle, the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test applies to emerging
technologies as societal expectations develop.188 But the Court has been repeatedly
tested in applying Fourth Amendment doctrine to emerging technologies. The Court
has churned out a casebook-worth of doctrine relating to warrantless searches of auto-
mobiles.189 In 1984, the Court held that certain chemical tests used to detect cocaine
do not require a warrant.190 In 2001, the Court held that warrantless use of a thermal
imaging camera to view the inside of a home violates the Fourth Amendment.191
In United States v. Jones,192 the Court held that warrantless use of a GPS tracking
device is violative of the Fourth Amendment.193 In an opinion by Justice Scalia, the
184 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967).
185 Id. at 351 (“[T]he parties have attached great significance to the characterization of the
telephone booth from which the petitioner placed his calls . . . . But this effort to decide
whether or not a given ‘area,’ viewed in the abstract, is ‘constitutionally protected’ deflects
attention from the problem in this case.”).
186 Id.
187 Id. at 360–61 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment).
188 See, e.g., Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2495 (2014) (holding officers may not
search information on a cell phone without a warrant):
Absent more precise guidance from the founding era, we generally
determine whether to exempt a given type of search from the warrant
requirement by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it in-
trudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to
which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.
Id. at 2484 (internal quotations omitted).
189 See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009) (holding an officer may search vehicle pas-
senger compartment without a warrant when the officer has a reasonable suspicion that an
individual, whether an arrestee or not, is dangerous and might access the vehicle to gain con-
trol of a dangerous weapon); Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615 (2004) (holding an
officer may lawfully search an arrestee’s passenger compartment without a warrant as a con-
temporaneous incident to arrest, even if the officer makes contact with the arrestee outside
the vehicle); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (holding an officer may lawfully search
an arrestee’s passenger compartment, and closed containers found within the passenger
compartment, without a warrant as a contemporaneous incident to arrest); see also New York
v. Class, 475 U.S. 106 (1986); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983); United States v.
Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
190 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 125 (1984).
191 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001). In Kyllo, Justice Scalia considered the
Court’s role not as adapting to new technologies but rather preserving the privacy that citi-
zens relied upon in the past. See id. at 34.
192 565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012).
193 Id.
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Court held the attachment of a GPS device to one’s vehicle constituted a common-law
trespass.194 Concurring in the judgment, Justice Sotomayor explicitly pointed to new
technology as vexing contemporary Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.195 She sug-
gested that government monitoring of GPS-enabled smartphones and other modes
of electronic surveillance that do not involve physical trespass must be approached
through evolving societal expectations under the lens of the Katz test.196
In June 2018, a sharply divided Court decided in Carpenter v. United States197that
days’ worth of an individual’s physical movements, as captured by cell-site location
information (i.e., time-stamped records of locations where a cellular phone connects
to a signal tower), is protected under the Fourth Amendment, and therefore to obtain
such records the government generally must obtain a search warrant supported by
probable cause.198 Previously, the Court had held that the inspection of personal records
held by third parties, such as billing information or call logs, was not a “search”
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.199 Chief Justice Roberts, writing for
the majority, pointed directly at technosocial change in his reasoning: “[I]n 1979,
few could have imagined a society in which a phone goes wherever its owner goes,
conveying to the wireless carrier not just dialed digits, but a detailed and comprehen-
sive record of the person’s movements.” The Court concluded that, although “[t]his
sort of digital data . . . does not fit neatly under existing precedent,”200 individuals
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in such information; therefore it is protected
under the Fourth Amendment.201 The law once again yielded to technosocial change
as the Court confronted the reality that servers now hold as much or more sensitive
information than our bedside drawers.
The Court, however, likes to insist its principles are unwavering. In Brown v.
Entertainment Merchants Association, for instance, the Court found that videogames
qualify for free speech protections, holding unconstitutional a California law prohib-
iting sale to minors of certain games depicting “killing, maiming, dismembering, or
sexually assaulting an image of a human being,” and requiring such games to be
specially labeled.202 In Entertainment Merchants, Justice Scalia asserted “whatever
the challenges of applying the Constitution to ever-advancing technology, the basic
194 Id. at 406–10.
195 Id. at 418 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
196 Id. at 415.
197 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
198 Id. At oral argument, counsel for Carpenter argued: “We are well over two decades into
the cell phone age. This is an area where . . . people’s use of this technology is well-settled
and only becoming more pervasive over time. We know the . . . direction, the cases before
the Court now, and . . . it is crucial that the Court act.” Transcript of Oral Argument at 78,
United States v. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) (No. 16-402).
199 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744–46 (1979).
200 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2214.
201 See id. at 2217–19.
202 564 U.S. 786, 789 (2011). See also CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1746–1746.5 (West 2009).
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principles of freedom of speech and the press . . . do not vary when a new and
different medium for communication appears.”203 The issue with Bartnicki, though,
is not about new technology, per se, but about the massive proliferation of a volume
and range of technologies that reshape society.204
And whether the Court admits or not, the Court has decided that changes in
technology warrant serious consideration and reconsideration of constitutional
interpretation and application.205 In this instance, rapid shifts in technology and
overwhelming risks to information privacy merit revisiting Bartnicki.
IV. THE MASSIVE TECHNOSOCIAL CHANGE SINCE 2001 SPECIFICALLY
WARRANTS REVISITING BARTNICKI
As the above Sections make clear, (1) since 2001, information technology has
grown dramatically and reshaped American society; (2) privacy interests are now
at far greater risk than they were in 2001; and (3) the Supreme Court has a history
of shaping its doctrine in accord with technosocial changes in society at large.
Following these precepts, the holding in Bartnicki should be relaxed to offer law-
makers wider latitude in protecting information privacy.
A. The Government Already Imposes Lawful Restrictions on Certain Disclosures
of Truthful Information
In his majority opinion in Bartnicki, Justice Stevens, glossing over privacy as
a compelling interest, makes a curious remark. In an attempt to narrow the scope of
his holding, he notes that the Court refuses “to answer categorically whether the
publication of truthful information may ever be punished consistent with the First
Amendment.”206 The remark is curious because, as Justice Breyer points out in his
concurrence,207 this supposedly open question has clearly been answered in the
affirmative. Certain truthful information may be prohibited from publication, and
its publication may be punished consistent with the First Amendment.
203 Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. at 790 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court
understood the apparent oddity of applying originalist principles to videogames. At oral argu-
ment, Justice Alito quipped, “I think what Justice Scalia wants to know is what James Madison
thought about video games. . . . Did he enjoy them?” Transcript of Oral Argument at 16,
Schwarzenegger v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786 (2011) (No. 08-1448).
204 Recall that Justice Scalia dissented in Bartnicki.
205 But see generally Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies:
Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801 (2004) (arguing, inter
alia, that legislatures are better equipped than courts to adjust constitutional principles to
emerging technologies).
206 Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 529 (2001).
207 Id. at 539 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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The law, and the Supreme Court, have long recognized communications privacy
and promotion of private speech as a compelling government interest; the Court likewise
has recognized personal privacy as an interest protected under the Constitution.208 For
example, as Justice Breyer cites, the publication of a trade secret is punishable by
money damages or an injunction, depending on the circumstances.209 A trade secret is
said to be destroyed by public knowledge,210 and thus public disclosure may be
interdicted—actual or threatened misappropriation of a trade secret (e.g., the Coca-Cola
syrup recipe) may be enjoined although even though truthful and of public concern.211
Although First Amendment principles generally limit prior restraint on public
disclosure, such as injunctions, courts are willing to impose damages under certain
circumstances.212 Lately developed common law recognizes public disclosure of
objectionable private information as a tort of “invasion of privacy” in some circum-
stances.213 The common law also imposes certain duties of confidentiality and dis-
cretion on fiduciaries, such as trustees and lawyers, breaches of which are recoverable
for damages in litigation.214 Courts consistently enforce private non-disclosure agree-
ments, even if the confidential information may touch on matters of public concern.215
Furthermore, Congress has repeatedly taken steps to protect certain private infor-
mation and has created statutory penalties for unlawful breach and dissemination.
208 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (“In a line of decisions . . . the Court has
recognized that a right of personal privacy . . . does exist under the Constitution.”); Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967); see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
483 (1965) (“[T]he First Amendment has a penumbra where privacy is protected from gov-
ernmental intrusion.”).
209 See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 539 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing Restatement (Third) of
Unfair Competition § 40, Comment c (1995)); see also, e.g., Winston Research Corp. v.
Minn. Min. & Mfg. Co., 350 F.2d 134 (9th Cir. 1965) (affirming a two-year injunction on
sales of tape recorder device that was designed and manufactured using misappropriated
trade secret knowledge); Ferdinand S. Tino, Annotation, Propriety of permanently enjoining
one guilty of unauthorized use of trade secret from engaging in sale or manufacturing of
device in question, 38 A.L.R. 3d 572, § 5a (1971); 42 Am. Jur. 2d Injunctions § 132 (2018)
(owner of a trade secret may obtain injunction against use or disclosure by another).
210 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985).
211 Id. § 2 (“Actual or threatened misappropriation may be enjoined.”).
212 See, e.g., Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
213 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
214 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, §§ 395–96 (AM. LAW INST. 1958) (concerning
use and disclosure of confidential information by fiduciaries); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
UNFAIR COMPETITION, §§ 39–45 (AM. LAW INST. 1995) (paralleling RESTATEMENT (FIRST)
OF TORTS, §§ 757–59 (AM. LAW INST. 1939)) (concerning liability for divulging trade secrets);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 59–67 (AM. LAW INST. 2000)
(concerning a lawyer’s duty of confidentiality).
215 California has passed statutes limiting confidentiality of settlement agreements in cases
where the factual foundation for the settlement represents the cause of action for certain
sexual offenses. See, e.g., 2016 CAL. STAT. 876 (amending CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1002).
See also Alan E. Garfield, Promises of Silence: Contract Law and Freedom of Speech, 83
CORNELL L. REV. 261 (1998).
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These include the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,216 the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure,217 the Espionage Act,218 the Privacy Act,219 the Intelligence Identities
Protection Act,220 the Fair Credit Reporting Act,221 the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act,222 the Video Privacy Protection Act,223 the Cable Television Consumer
Protection and Competition Act,224 the Health Insurance Portability and Accountabil-
ity Act (HIPAA),225 the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA),226 and the
Wiretap Act itself,227 among numerous others. Each of these statutes carves out various
duties of reporting and confidentiality and penalties for breach of such provisions.
These legal principles and statutes demonstrate various ways where courts and
legislators have attempted to tailor the law to prioritize and protect privacy interests
in specific circumstances.
216 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2)(B) (imposing secrecy obligation on certain persons
involved in a grand jury proceeding).
217 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c) (detailing rules for various protective orders, including secrecy,
in discovery). Also consider the rules of ethics for practicing attorneys, and expectations of
confidentiality. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 1.6 (AM. BAR. ASS’N 1983).
218 Espionage Act of 1917, Pub. L. 65-24, 40 Stat. 217 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 792–99 (2012)).
219 Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (codified as amended at 5
U.S.C. § 552a (2012)) (amending the Administrative Procedure Act to require federal agen-
cies to maintain minimum privacy and disclosure standards).
220 Intelligence Identities Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 97-200, 96 Stat. 122 (codified as
amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 421–26 (2012)).
221 Fair Credit Reporting Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (1970) (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1830–31, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–81x (2012)) (amending the Federal
Deposit Insurance Act to require ensured financial institutions to maintain records and
privacy procedures).
222 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848
(extending protections of Wiretap Act to include electronic communications such as email,
and extending protections to stored electronic files and phone call tracing technologies)
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–20, 2701–12, 3121–27 (2012)).
223 Video Game Privacy Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-618, 102 Stat. 3195 (creating a
private cause of action against a covered entity who reveals customer’s video rental history)
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2012)).
224 Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102
-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (establishing numerous rules and regulations for subscription television
services, including subscriber privacy rules) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 551 (2012)).
225 Health Insurance and Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191,
110 Stat. 1936 The patient privacy provisions are codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1302(a), 1320d
to 1320d-9. See also 45 C.F.R. §§ 160.101 to 160.552, 164.102 to 164.106; 164.500 to
164.534.
226 Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681
-728 (creating minimum consent, confidentiality, and disclosure for personally identifying
information of persons under 13 years of age) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–06 (2012)).
227 Pub. L. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (1968); 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–22.
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B. The Law Can Protect Communication Privacy Interests in Certain Limited
Ways, Without Unduly Burdening Free Speech
The theft of information such as from a server or phone conversation is reminis-
cent of situations lately implicating the Fourth Amendment’s “reasonable expectation
of privacy standard.”228 Fourth Amendment principles lend themselves, by analogy,
reasonably well to the Bartnicki context. The balance of Free Speech interests should
be judged against the privacy interests of the communicant, including her reasonable
expectation of privacy. Where the interests of the publisher are merely salacious or
prurient, as in publication of stolen private sexual material, even prior restraint of
speech may be warranted.
The statute at issue in Bartnicki already narrowed that category of punishable
conduct to publication where the publisher “knew or should have known” the infor-
mation had been obtained illegally.229 In other words, the publishing party is not
utterly blameless, but is simply placed in the role of discriminating against wrongdoers.
It is true that Justice Stevens confined his holding by centering his reasoning on the
content of the stolen information, through the “amorphous concept”230 of “public
concern,” meaning so long as the leaked material is salacious enough to the public,
it is unprotected for First Amendment privacy interest purposes.
The Supreme Court has long applied a “public concern” heuristic in Free Speech
cases,231 in particular those involving either government employees or defamation.232
In the government employment context, a government employee may be punished
for public statements unless the statements touch on matters of public concern, after
which a balancing test is applied, weighing the interests of the government body against
the free speech interests of the employee.233 In this case, though, “public concern” oper-
ates as against the public at large, and squares with the Court’s long-time, understandable
228 See generally Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (holding that a speaker has
a reasonable expectation of privacy over a conversation in a sealed phone booth).
229 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(c) (emphasis added).
230 See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 542 (2001) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
231 See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) (holding that a public employee’s free
speech rights depend in part on whether the employee’s speech touches on matters of public
concern); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (holding that public employees may
not be compelled to relinquish Free Speech rights to comment on matters of public concern);
cf. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006) (holding that when public employees make
statements pursuant to their own official duties, they are not speaking as citizens on matters
of public concern for First Amendment purposes).
232 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (restricting damages a private
individual could obtain from a publisher in defamation cases where the subject matter at
issue was of public concern); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S.
749, 760–61 (1985) (delineating a “reduced constitutional value of speech involving no mat-
ters of public concern” when calculating damages in defamation cases).
233 See supra note 231.
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reluctance to punish publication on matters that touch on public policy, such as the
Pentagon Papers.234
The “amorphous” public concern test is in practice unwieldy. Matters possibly
or arguably of public concern, such as corporate communications, are extremely
vulnerable to theft and disclosure.235 Consider the stolen batch of emails of Clinton
campaign chairman John Podesta that contained numerous communications about
campaign strategy and policy—arguably matters of public concern, but also important
private, internal campaign communication, the likes of which is probably chilled in
future national-office campaign efforts.236 Additionally, the batch of Podesta emails
contained numerous private exchanges, recipes, and information about children,237
all potentially protected under Bartnicki as matters of public concern. Is a court to
review each of the 20,000 emails and decide which are and are not of public concern?
Drawing from the example of the State of Washington’s wiretap statute, which
carves out disclosure exceptions in certain emergencies,238 I would suggest a narrower
definition of “public concern.” It is a matter of “public concern” when it implicates
a credible and substantial safety threat against the public, a specific group, or a
234 The “newsworthiness” certainly seems relevant. It is not ridiculous to suppose Bartnicki
was an example of easy facts making bad law. The transcript of Bartnicki and Kane’s re-
corded conversation seems as though two high-ranking union officials were planning acts
of violence against local government employees. It would be difficult for the Court to allow
the punishment of a newspaper for sharing that information with the public.
235 See discussion supra Part II.
236 See Matthew Yglesias, Against Transparency, VOX (Sept. 6, 2016), https://www.vox
.com/2016/9/6/12732252/against-transparency [https://perma.cc/9Y55-MBXP] (arguing ex-
ecutive branch officials’ electronic communications should be confidential to promote candor
and efficiency) (“[A] private conversation to facilitate a frank exchange of ideas is not the
same as a secret bombing campaign in Cambodia. We need to let public officials talk to each
other—and to their professional contacts outside the government—in ways that are both
honest and technologically modern.”).
237 See, e.g., Lawrence Marcus, Wikileaks Hack Reveals John Podesta’s Secret to Creamy
Risotto, FOOD & WINE (Oct. 11, 2016), https://www.foodandwine.com/news/wikileaks-hack
-reveals-john-podestas-secret-creamy-risotto [https://perma.cc/VN6K-A2S3]. For other ex-
amples of stolen emails that would probably not meet a reasonable definition of “public
concern,” see It’s a Girl!, WIKILEAKS: ARCHIVE OF JOHN PODESTA EMAILS, https://wikileaks
.org/podesta-emails/emailid/47663 [https://perma.cc/5SKY-YX5M] (last visited Oct. 15, 2018)
(announcing the birth of a healthy baby girl); Re: Connecting, WIKILEAKS: ARCHIVE OF JOHN
PODESTA EMAILS, https://wikileaks.org/podesta-emails/emailid/40914 [https://perma.cc
/A88C-TEU5] (last visited Oct. 15, 2018) (describing plans to attend a meeting of a book
club); Re: Nicki Minaj Doesn’t Think Her Butt Is Unacceptable | ThinkProgress, WIKILEAKS:
ARCHIVE OF JOHN PODESTA EMAILS, https://wikileaks.org/podesta-emails/emailid/18048 [https://
perma.cc/8V6Y-TLUE] (last visited Oct. 15, 2018) (Podesta remarking on “booty equity”).
238 See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9.73.030(2), (4) (2018) (deeming consent of a party where in-
tercepted conservation relates to certain emergency situations); see also Bartnicki, 532 U.S.
514, 539 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“Where publication of private information constitutes a wrong-
ful act, the law recognizes a privilege allowing the reporting of threats to public safety.”).
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specific individual. This would create a clearer rule, which protects the interests of
publishers of information regarding threats to public safety and which is consistent
with sound public policy observed in other areas of the law.239 Congress could also
authorize the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to define what are matters
of public concern, much as the FCC already defines what is profane.
The Court, too, could draw boundaries that would offer more certainty and a
broader range of applications for punishing the dissemination of stolen conversations
and personal information. For instance, certain contours of public concern as applied
to this statute could be left to the jury.
And as both the Court of Appeals and the dissent point out in Bartnicki, § 2511
of the Wiretap Act—the section at issue in the case—was content-neutral,240 and
therefore was not subject to strict scrutiny, theoretically leaving some judicial room
for legislative tinkering. The Wiretap Act exists to protect and ensure the privacy of
one’s home, which is recognized as an important constitutional interest.241 Justice
Brandeis understood the great importance of privacy interests back in the nineteenth
century.242 An unambiguous privacy safeguard written in the law reassures individuals
to “overcome our natural reluctance to discuss private matter when we fear that our
private conversations may become public.”243 Seen through this lens, the initial mis-
appropriation of private information is not the harmful activity so much as the mass
disclosure to the community—after all, the petitioners in Bartnicki were concerned
not so much with the interception of their conversation but with the broadcast.
Furthermore, as Justice Stevens admits in Bartnicki, the anti-wiretap statute already
restricts the free speech interests of the thief herself, and Stevens is not willing to hold
that the thief cannot be punished under § 2511(1)(c).
239 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 595 cmt. g (AM LAW INST. 1977)
(privilege to report that another intends to kill or rob); id. § 652G (privilege applies as a
defense to invasion of privacy); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 40 cmt.
c (AM. LAW. INST. 1995) (trade secret may be disclosed if relevant to public health or safety);
MODEL R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.6(b)-(1) (AM. BAR. ASS’N 1983) (lawyer-client confidentiality
may be broken where there is a risk of severe injury or death of another); see also Lachman
v. Sperry-Sun Well Surveying Co., 457 F.2d 850, 852 (10th Cir. 1972) (non-disclosure
agreement void as to criminal activity); Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. Cal., 551 P.2d 334,
343–44 (Cal. 1976) (psychologist-patient privilege not binding where there is a specific
danger to another).
240 See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 548 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
241 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (“In a line of decisions . . . the Court
has recognized a right of personal privacy . . . does exist under the Constitution.”); Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965) (“[T]he First Amendment has a penumbra where
privacy is protected from governmental intrusion.”).
242 See Pavesich v. New Eng. Life Ins., Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905). See generally Samuel
D. Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890) (articulating
various features in the law collectively giving rise to a “right to be left alone”).
243 Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 537.
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Finally, as jurisprudential deference goes, it is important to note the majority in
Bartnicki was a “soft” majority. Three justices agreed with Justice Stevens, and two
joined the judgment in concurrence. But looking at the opinions another way, a five-
justice majority agreed that Congress could constitutionally punish certain third-party
publications. The soft majority in the original decision suggests there is significant
disagreement on the Court over this issue. The Court should not feel constrained in
revisiting the issue, and the dissent has already previewed the grounds for reversal.
CONCLUSION
Bartnicki exists in a nebula of numerous forces that are chilling private speech.
Savvy tech users are resorting to high-end encryption technologies. Corporations are
adopting strict, onerous communications policies to avoid misappropriation of
communications. A reversal or relaxation of Bartnicki would offer an important tool
to those who have been victimized by near-ubiquitous eavesdropping and information
theft and would create a small, but meaningful deterrent against those who might
engage in such behavior.
A complete reversal of Bartnicki is not necessary nor desirable. The Free Speech
interests at its heart are of grave importance. But there are several aspects of Bartnicki
that could be tailored. A balanced principle more consistent with Justice Breyer’s
concurrence would be desirable. Specifically, the legitimacy of a would-be-plaintiff’s
privacy interest, including her reasonable expectations of privacy under the circum-
stances, should be weighed against the First Amendment interests at issue.
Additionally, Bartnicki’s crucial “public concern” element is problematic in this
context because (1) it is subjective; (2) it imposes a post facto content-based test after
the theft and transfer of information we want to deter; and (3) leaks may be of “mixed
composition” where they could be of limited or partial public concern. Legislatures
could therefore attempt to legislate a suitable definition of “public concern” or
delegate authority to an agency to do so. Regardless what the specific prescription
is, “the Constitution permits legislatures to respond flexibly to the challenges future
technology may pose . . . . ”244
Setting Bartnicki itself aside, Congress and the courts will inevitably face the
tide of technosocial change. In his Olmstead dissent, Justice Brandeis hypothesized
the Court might someday have to square thought-reading technology with the Fourth
Amendment.245 Libertarian pro-gun activists have already devised crude working
firearms that a 3D printer can print.246 Smartphones are beginning to replace lawyers
244 Id. at 541 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
245 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). See
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in simple legal actions, which may someday implicate the Sixth Amendment.247 Machine-
learning software can now convincingly swap faces of subjects in a video;248 reshape
a subject’s lip movements to sync with artificially replaced audio;249 and change the
scenes of outdoor photographs to a different season, for example, a summer photo
to apparently autumn.250
The reality is the Constitution does not exist in a vacuum. “Time works changes,
brings into existence new conditions and purposes.”251 New technologies have con-
founded the existing legal order. In the application of the First Amendment to stolen
communications, the “sanctities of . . . home and privacies of life”252 insist that the
law change.
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